writer: Annemarie Baylouny
Supposedly, the Trump administration is focused on making the US relevant in the world, flaunting its power, making people “respect us again.” It chided Obama for somehow being weak internationally and not exerting American military power over enemies and allies alike. One would think that includes combatting Russian dominance, and rhetorically, it does for some parts of the administration. Defense officials focus on the great power competition, (a.k.a GPC) between the U.S., Russia, and China. They worry that Russia and China are getting ahead, making inroads where the U.S. used to be dominant. But in the weighty issue of the Syrian refugees and rebels, it is Russia who holds sway.
The U.S. worries, but not enough to change policies. Instead of attempting to expand its influence, as it purportedly aims to do, the U.S. has pulled back from prior engagements, allowing other players to take the lead in the vacuum it leaves behind. And these others are Russia and China, the very countries the U.S. is worried about. So why all the concern about great power competition that now dominates realists nightmares? We hear fears about Russia and China out-competing the U.S. in global influence, alliances, technology, and military assistance. Analysts look for remedies to the situation, but they have not questioned the premise of the “problem” itself.
Borrowed from the New York Times…
The irony of what is being called great power competition is its total lack in many areas of the world: there is no apparent conflict – the U.S. is just absent, by its own choice. This is not to argue that the U.S. should be militarily present, but stating a fact. And this fact contradicts the rhetoric of a great America and concern about influence. Locally in the Middle East, there appears to be no active competition between the great powers. The presence of the US military is still clear in the Middle East today, but not its influence. It is not viewed as a broker who can be counted on, turned to, or who can solve problems. Instead, its presence is more that of a lame duck.
The contrast to when I first arrived in the Middle East, during the Cold War, is striking. Businessmen, elites, and national leaders now fly to Moscow for discussions. Everyone wonders what Russia will do, what business deals it will make or what it will do in Syria next. Russia dominates Syria, the U.S. all but left the scene. Russia will control all the reconstruction and its attendant money, and provide or deny access to Syria for charities and international organizations, and will be the real power behind any negotiated settlement in the Syrian civil war. Russia helps states in the region deal with the Assad regime, not the U.S.
Russia is even making inroads with democratic states, who are not traditionally allies for Russia. Tunisia needs help with counter-terrorism, and Russia has stepped up to the plate. They share interests both in the jihadis returning from or going to Syria, and in preventing the spread of next-door Libya’s radical elements. These are some of the legitimate needs and concerns of countries in the Middle East that the U.S. is not answering, but that Russia is.
The Syrian refugees are another important issue for Syria’s neighbors and the wider region. Russia partly determines their fate. Russia has continually promoted the return of Syrians, publicizing even the smallest number of returns weekly. And, floods the media with the idea that this is a trend, communicating both to the Syrians and their host countries that the situation is safe. The rest, therefore, should return. Already we see Russia discussing with host country officials the fate of the refugees and conditions for them to leave for Syria. Russia even acted as the guarantor for such returns, although such promises mean little and are frequently broken. Some rebels even report that Russia is the only power keeping the regime off their backs once they have agreed to a truce. Refugees are both a sign that Russia has stabilized its Syrian ally and a stick to wield against a frugal international community. Refugee repatriation signals to the world that the conflict is over, it is now safe to return.
This serves Russia’s goal of normalizing the Assad regime while solidifying Bashar al-Assad’s control. It also serves Russia’s financial goals, as the great power in charge of Syria (Russia) will inevitably control reconstruction of the country. Even now, Russia determines a great deal of ground policy, and for the past several years surrounding state businesses have viewed Moscow as directly the large profit that will come with rebuilding a destroyed state.
Borrowed from the Los Angeles Times….
Control over the course of refugee repatriation and Syria’s stability can also be used as a threat to the international community. Reconstruction of the country will not come cheap, and Russia is determined to raise that money however it can, whether voluntarily from the international community or by threatening future waves of refugees due to instability in Syria. With power to either stabilize or inflame the war in Syria, the latter leading to mass exodus of refugees, Russia informed Europe that one and a half million refugees could be headed its way. In the next breath, it asked for reconstruction money for Syria.
This is no empty threat. Given that Lebanon and Jordan have shut their doors to further migration, Russia’s new relationship with Turkey could allow Syrians to exit through that route. Turkey, of course, controls the route to Europe. Turkey policed the sea route to Greece through a deal with Europe, a deal which has not lived up to Turkey’s satisfaction. Turkey is nowhere closer to EU membership than it was before. Hosting refugees is also expensive, and Turkey has complained of the expense.
Russia is controlling and playing the game, and the world is shifting its attention East. The U.S. isn’t losing the global competition to Russia, it is sitting out this round of play. What the U.S. is doing quite well is shouting from the sidelines. In that, it wins.