writers: Anne Marie Baylouny and Anshu N. Chatterjee
Why did Saudi Arabia go after Qatar? The new cracks sprung up seemingly out of thin air, yet close observers knew that the differences between these two similar Gulf countries are extensive. From a western policy perspective, the two appear the same, both conservative Muslim states using tradition and religion to govern, afraid of Iran's regional influence, and rich in oil. Yet, the fight between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is historical: in fact, it structured the trajectory of the Syrian opposition in its ongoing civil war. The countries backed and funded rival groups, Qatar embracing the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia doing whatever it could to destroy Muslim Brotherhoods across the world, including Egypt’s. The Gulf Crisis, as it is now called, possibly triggered by President Trump’s visit that bolstered the Saudi regime, is now implicated in numerous events and realignments in the region. Several states caught in the middle are being forced to pick a side. So far, Saudi money is heavily swaying their decision.
In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood was the most established organization at the start of the uprising. Its legacy in Syria was violent and terror-ridden, culminating in the battle with Hafiz al-Assad's government in 1979-82 and the regime's wholesale destruction of Hama, but that was some three decades and at least one generation prior to the uprising. The actors in that prior incarnation either went into exile, were killed or imprisoned, or accommodated themselves to the Syrian regime. In its post-2000 manifestation, Muslim Brotherhood was the group closest to the Syrian people and most vested in the Syrian nation than all the other oppositional groups.
For the Saudi royalty, the fatal flaw of the Muslim Brotherhoods is their desire to work within a democratic system or an electoral system in quasi-authoritarian regimes. They watched with horror as the internal processes of some Muslim Brotherhoods in the region showed real debate and changes in representation. Dogma and interpretations of Islam even changed to the point of expanding the legitimized roles for women, which is most particularly vexing to the Saudis. The wide-spread idea in the West that Muslim Brotherhoods are worse for human rights, democracy, and peace than the Wahhabi brand of Islam runs counter to reality.
Ultimately, these dynamic interpretations of conventional dogma would lead to questioning the legitimacy of a monarch -- therein lies Saudi's nightmare: questioning of monarchy from within an Islamist framework. Saudi dominates Islamist ideologies in the region and successfully imparts that ideology to its own subjects, believing the main threat came from secularism and the left. Instead, they now face challenges from the right; from a more centrist position, the Muslim Brotherhood espouses electoral representation and from, the extreme right, the non-democratic so-called Islamic State eschews any version of monarchic rule. While Qataris are also a monarchy, the representative facets of the Muslim Brotherhood do not trouble them as much as ISIS does.
The Obvious...(source: Gary Barker for Newsbase, twitter)
Qataris are also not so worried about Iran, the Saudi fixation. The Saudi and Iranians have interpreted regional politics through the lens of a mini Cold War complete with proxies. Lebanese politics is a fight between Iranian and Saudi sponsorees, as is the Syrian opposition to Assad regime. The lines were drawn decades ago, and most starkly after the Gulf War of 2003. The constituencies are not in danger of being confused or swayed to another side: their identities are for the most part religious, although the actual lines between Shi'a and Sunni are blurred and complicated, with many mixed marriages and secular individuals caught in the middle. But Iran is not the biggest threat for Saudi in the region, as this episode and the Syrian civil war reveal. It would appear Qatar is even more threatening for Saudi influence in the region; a power that could rival itself for leadership of its own constituency. The thorough demonization of Qatar, whipped up practically overnight, is a directed script worthy of Wag the Dog.
Qatari Hunters in Iraq (Image borrowed from Iraq Tradelink News Agency
One of Saudi complaints against Qatar is that it allows the presence of Hamas officials on its territory. Saudi here echoes Israel's line, contrary to general Arab opinion, that Hamas is terrorist. Potentially at the heart of the crisis is ransom money paid by Qatar to free Qatari hunters who were kidnapped by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia, known as Kata’eb Hizbollah, in December 2015. The money potentially ended up with Iranian-backed Syrians.
The fight is mirrored in the America's internal divisions as well: Bloomberg news discusses Trump's blunder on Qatar while Fox embraces Saudi statements, portraying Saudis in a humanitarian guise, aiding those hurt by the blockade it created. The White House is similarly divided, as State and Defense departments attempt to mitigate the stark line laid down by the Saudis and reiterated by the US president. Wittingly or not, the US has entangled itself in regional squabbles that do nothing to forward US regional goals, peace, or democratic principles, and that further endanger its major regional base in Qatar.
President Trump enjoys sword waving on his Saudi trip. (source: Alalam News Network)
The irony is that by isolating Qatar, Saudi is pushing both Qatar and other Sunni organizations closer to non-Arab and non-Sunni states, namely Iran and Turkey. Perhaps Saudis do not mind this outcome, as long as it maintains its place as leader of the Sunni world. Yet, its ideology is a hair shy of the so-called Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. The main question is not why Saudi chose its anti-Qatar stance, but how the US battle against extremists will fare now. This dichotomous line is not that of extremism versus moderate Islam. Only in some parallel universe, supplemented by Saudi wealth, could Saudi Islam be interpreted as moderate.