writer: Anshu N. Chatterjee
In September 2018, the Indian parliament under the leadership of Narendra Modi, banned talaq-e-biddat, a form of talaq that allows men to instantaneously divorce their spouses. The other forms of talaq - also male initiated - insist on a waiting period that provides some time for reflection. Women, under Islamic law, have the right to divorce if they can prove abuse, madness, or impotency. Talaq-e-biddat is already banned in countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where Islam appears to take precedence over competing legal frameworks. And Shias don’t recognize such a talaq, so the point is often moot in countries such as Iran.
The ban follows a Supreme Court decision that criminalized such a divorce in 2017. The ban also produced two kinds of protestors: first, the Muslim Personal Law Board that opposes it based on constitutional guarantees that permit religious communities to use their own personal code for civil decisions, the importance of separating the state and family, and the exclusive targeting of the Muslim community by Hindu nationalists. The second set of protestors are liberals and feminists, who agree that the Muslim community is uniquely targeted and more critically, the ban does not provide the guarantees that Muslim women require. The issue is not the legality of the divorce, but the division of assets, child custody, and support.
And they are both correct. The anti-triple talaq struggle, pushed by some women’s rights organizations, including the Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, has a lengthy history but more recently was appropriated by the BJP to serve its own purpose. The BJP’s reasons for doing this is what one would expect. It is election time and they need to show to their constituencies that they are doing something about containing Islam as they have promised. The ban is a signal to the BJP’s Hindu nationalist critics that it’s fulfilling its promise of fixing pseudo-secularism perpetuated by the Congress that has supposedly benefited Muslims. How aiding Muslim women will help the Hindu community is unclear but the plan is to please people who are afraid of Islam.
The logic is a bit convoluted: targeting Muslim rights is easier than using Hindu codes and symbols to mobilize the Hindu community. Hinduism, as we know, is a decentralized religion lacking a dominant legal framework, which makes it difficult to produce a consistent religious code. Some Hindu texts that could potentially provide guidance on civil life at times quite liberal and anti-patriarchy. For instance, Dhraupadi had five husbands, Sita got to pick her own, and then there are Vaishnu, Durga and Kali, all quite outside the patriarchal mode.
In fact, Hindu nationalists have at times united in opposition to attempts at codification of Hindu norms, particularly when it comes to gender equality. In 1956, when Nehru attempted to codify the Hindu code, i.e., forbidding polygamy, some men threatened to convert to Islam. Similarly, the Women’s Succession Bill was protested by S. P. Mookherjee, the founder of the BJS, and the leadership of Hindu Mahasabha for being anti-tradition. More recently, Yogi Adityanath’s statement that women need protection not independence is a deep-rooted perspective that is not going away anytime soon. The Uniform/Universal Civil Code proposed by the BJP is not proposed as a form of a Hindu code; rather, it is proposed as a form of a secular code despite some non-secular elements that are embedded in it.
The ban is also an attempts to divide the Muslim vote by capturing the Muslim women vote. This strategy is based on some numbers in the previous national election; apparently, 56% of Muslims who voted for the BJP were women. The assumption here is a significant one: Muslim women who voted for the BJP hope for reform. Yet, evidence that backs this theory is lacking. First, the number is a lot less impressive when one looks at accompanying statistics. Eight to ten percent of the total Muslim population of India who votes, voted for the BJP. Out of which 22% of them were Shias who could care less about talaq-a-biddat. The surveys also suggest that such Muslims tend to be more conservative and want to preserve rather than seek to reform the Islamic code. Some of them also tend to be more educated. In other words, most Muslim women who vote for the BJP are not seeking to be rescued.
And now for the dilemma…
Should feminists agree with this decision? Is this not a step closer to gender equality? The ban doesn’t resolve the issues of division of assets, inheritances, or child support, but it does provide time for women to appeal for justice. It may simply be a symbolic gesture that shows that women matter, if not to their spouses, definitely to some others. And it creates some space for the next step in granting rights. Furthermore, some Muslim women are definitely seeking reform. Should we ignore them in order to deny BJP some legitimacy? The sacrificing of gender equality for the sake of the larger community is not new, but can occasionally be challenged.
As for the Indian state, led currently by the BJP who will remain a power house in the parliament even after the upcoming election, if it really cares about Muslim women, it should consult them about what to do about another important decision that could use a feminist perspective. The Babri Mosque issue is currently under deliberation in the Supreme Court. Women definitely don’t want temples or mosques built upon the blood of their or anyone else’s children. Let’s hope that the decision is delayed after the election so it can’t be used to mobilize people. The subject of another blog -stay tuned.
